近年来，地方政府为了发展基础设施，与开发商达成协议，让开发商以较低价格获得土地。开发商的条件是帮助地方政府建设桥梁、道路、学校、医院和购物中心等基础设施。项目完成后，开发商还会协助吸引投资。曾经，这种共生关系在一段蜜月期内繁荣发展。
In past years, local governments, aiming for infrastructure development, struck deals with developers allowing them to obtain land at lower prices. The catch was that developers would help the local governments with infrastructure like building bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, and shopping centers. After completion, developers would also assist in attracting investment. For a time, this symbiotic relationship blossomed in a mutual honeymoon phase.
然而，随着地方经济逐渐好转，许多地方政府似乎“翻脸不认人”，要求开发商先完成基础设施项目，再讨论土地审批事宜。不幸的是，开发商履行完自己的承诺后，由于各种原因，土地审批往往被拒，导致许多开发商不满但大多保持沉默。
However, as local economies began to improve, many local governments seemed to turn on their developer partners, suggesting they complete infrastructure projects before discussing land approvals. Unfortunately, after the developers fulfilled their end, land approvals were sometimes denied for various reasons, leaving many developers aggrieved but mostly silent.
建筑行业本质上有较长的资金回笼周期，有时需要5-6年才能完全回款。而在此期间，人工、材料和销售的支出持续，带来了巨大的财务压力。开发商制定了一种策略，即将建成的物业抵押给银行。一旦房产出售，购房者会向银行还款。有趣的是，许多购房者通过银行贷款购房，这意味着在整个过程中，实际上是银行拥有了房产。
The construction industry inherently has a long capital turnover cycle, sometimes taking 5-6 years for full repayment. Meanwhile, expenses for labor, materials, and sales persist, creating significant financial pressure. A strategy devised by developers was to mortgage their constructed properties to banks. Once the property was sold, homeowners would repay the bank. Interestingly, many homeowners financed their purchases with bank loans, meaning the bank technically owned the property throughout the process.
开发商意识到，在这种模式下，他们不必担心销售问题，只需将房产抵押即可获得资金。随着房价不断上涨，开发商可以不断建设，确保资金流动，然后将这些资金投入高回报的项目。
Developers realized under this scheme they didn’t have to worry about sales — they simply had to mortgage properties to gain funds. With house prices continuously rising, developers could keep building, ensuring a steady cash flow, and then invest these funds in high-return ventures.
甚至有开发商雇佣演员在楼盘现场制造热销的假象，试图说服潜在购房者和银行相信房产的吸引力。
There were even incidents where developers hired actors to create a façade of booming sales at property sites, aiming to convince both potential buyers and banks of the property’s attractiveness.
随着房价在全国范围内飙升，即使在三四线城市，房价往往也超过了当地居民的收入水平。“本地人买不起本地房”的现象广为流传。
With house prices skyrocketing across China, even in third and fourth-tier cities, property prices often surpassed local incomes. The phenomenon of “locals can’t afford local homes” became widely discussed.
“房住不炒”的政策标志着房地产调控的开始，各种措施陆续出台以控制房价和贷款。市场很快做出了冷却反应。地方政府收紧了土地审批，从“限墅令”到全面“禁墅”，再到限制高层地块，意在遏制房地产行业的无序扩张。
The decree “Houses are for living in, not for speculation” signaled the start of real estate regulation, with various measures introduced to control property prices and loans. The market soon responded with a cooldown. Local governments tightened land approval processes, from a “villa restriction order” to an outright “villa ban”, followed by restrictions on high-rise plots, all aiming to curb the wild and chaotic expansion of real estate.
随后，央行和住建部在2021年1月1日发布了开发商融资政策，即所谓的“三道红线”：
- 扣除预收款后的资产负债率超过70%；
- 净负债率超过100%；
- 现金短债比低于1。
Soon after, the central bank and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development issued financing policies for developers, effective from January 1, 2021. These were the so-called “three red lines”:
- An asset-liability ratio greater than 70% after deducting advance receipts.
- A net debt ratio exceeding 100%.
- A cash-to-short-term debt ratio below 1.
到2023年中，12家试点房地产公司必须达到所有“三道红线”标准，所有公司预计在2023年底前合规。
By mid-2023, the 12 pilot real estate companies had to meet all these “three red line” standards, with all companies expected to comply by the end of 2023.
恒大触碰了所有这些红线，减债成为其首要任务。通过资产出售、文化领域的剥离、债转股及其他融资形式，但这些行动只暴露了其巨大的财务黑洞，高达3000亿美元的债务震惊了全球，因其可能引发全球金融危机。然而，外国媒体和投资者达成了一个奇怪的共识：“中国能够处理恒大的问题。”
Evergrande hit all these red lines, making debt reduction its top priority. Various measures were taken, from asset sales, divestments in cultural sectors, debt-to-equity swaps, to other forms of financing. But these actions only exposed the colossal financial black hole, a shocking $300 billion debt, which alarmed the global community given its potential to trigger a worldwide financial crisis. Yet, there was an unusual consensus among foreign media and investors: “China can handle the Evergrande situation.”
到目前为止，国家尚未明确表示干预。信息似乎向企业巨头们传递了一个明确的信号：“没有任何公司大到不能倒。”控制金融风险已经成为中国企业必须谨记的教训。
So far, there’s no clear sign of the state intervening. The message seems clear to corporate giants: “No company is too big to fail.” Controlling financial risks has become a lesson that Chinese enterprises must heed.
房地产行业的黄金时代似乎正在逐渐消逝。开发商利用金融杠杆快速发展的时代已经不复存在。
The golden age for the real estate industry seems to be waning. The era where property developers leveraged financial gains for rapid growth no longer exists.
此外，城投债（即“城投债”或“City Investment Bonds”）也成为关注焦点。这些债券主要由地方政府融资平台（LGFVs）发行，在过去几十年里对中国的城市化进程发挥了关键作用。
Beyond the above, city investment bonds (often referred to as “城投债” or “City Investment Bonds”) have also become a topic of concern. These bonds, mainly issued by local government financing platforms (LGFVs), have played a pivotal role in fueling China’s urbanization drive over the past few decades.
开发商如碧桂园与城投平台关系密切。例如，碧桂园可能从这些平台购买土地，或与它们合作开发。这意味着，当这些平台面临金融风险时，像碧桂园这样的开发商也会直接受到影响。
There’s a close relationship between developers like Country Garden and city investment platforms. For instance, Country Garden might buy land from these platforms or collaborate with them for development. This means that when these platforms face financial risks, developers like Country Garden are directly impacted.
为了应对这些风险，许多开发商，包括碧桂园，正在寻找新的合作模式和资金来源。但显然，这并不是一朝一夕可以解决的问题。这意味着，中国的房地产市场可能会经历一个长期的调整和变化期。
To combat these risks, many developers, including Country Garden, are searching for new partnership models and funding sources. But, clearly, this isn’t an issue that can be resolved overnight. This implies that China’s real estate market might face a prolonged period of adjustment and change.
以上内容均为个人观点，部分信息来源于网络。如有版权或监管问题，请联系作者。
All the content above represents personal opinions. Some information is sourced from the internet. Please contact the author for any copyright or regulatory concerns.